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5.1 Introduction 
 
The official goals of monetary policy in the Franc Zone are to maintain price stability and 
maintain an appropriate level of foreign reserves, which are the pooled foreign exchange 
reserves of the member states (IMF 2001: 17). At the zone level the BCEAO uses a mixture 
of indirect policy instruments (the discount rate mechanism, a repurchase agreement facility 
                                                 
1 We gratefully acknowledge helpful comments from Professor David Fielding, Dr Kalvinder 
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and a system of periodic auctions of central bank bills)2 to pursue these goals. However, the 
monetary policy at the zone level will not necessarily suit all the member states in the zone. 
Table 5.1 shows the cross-country correlations between some of the macroeconomic variables 
that the BCEAO appears to react to at the zone level (Shortland and Stasavage 2003). It can 
be seen that output gaps and inflation rates are not strongly correlated within the zone.3 There 
may therefore be a need to complement the interest rate setting at the zone level with further 
policies to suit the economic situation in individual Franc Zone member countries. 
 
In the past country-level credit planning was the main monetary policy tool in the Franc Zone 
(Honohan 1990: 3). The monetary programming exercise determined planned credit growth in 
each member country and the programme was implemented through credit ceilings on 
government borrowing and central bank refinancing of private sector credit. Credit growth in 
one country did not substantially spill over from one country to the other countries in the 
zone, as the capital markets were not well integrated.  
 
Despite the recent efforts to move towards indirect tools of monetary policy and away from 
credit planning, the BCEAO retains a number of policy tools, which would enable it to 
continue to pursue independent credit policies for each member country. The tools of credit 
ceilings on governments and limits on the rediscounting of bank loans have been strengthened 
since the late 1980s and a third potential policy tool has been introduced: reserve 
requirements on banks. Capital market integration also remains underdeveloped. A weak 
                                                 
2 These are relatively infrequent. For example during 2000 there were no auctions of central 
bank bills. 
3 This is also true for the pre 1994 period as shown by Bayoumi and Ostry (1997). 
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system of payments and delivery and a lack of confidence among banks about other banks’ 
solvency prevent inter-bank lending, especially across national borders (IMF 2001: 19). 
Country-level credit planning is therefore still a potential monetary policy mechanism. 
 
The policy framework for the Franc Zone is discussed in a number of recent publications (for 
example, Union Monetaire Ouest Africaine 1989, IMF 2001). There is also some empirical 
literature on monetary policy formation in the Franc Zone (for example, Fielding 2002, 
Savvides 1998). However, there are no recent examinations of how monetary policy is 
conducted at the national level: the existing studies are based on data before the devaluation 
of the CFA franc in 1994. The aim of this study is to address the question whether a 
systematic country-level credit policy has been implemented since 1995.  
 
BCEAO policy tools 
 
The first policy tool of the BCEAO that could be used to achieve balanced money growth is 
the enforcement of credit ceilings on government borrowing (IMF 2001: 18). The BCEAO 
statutes limited central bank credit to each member government to 20 per cent of the previous 
year’s fiscal receipts.4 However, it is not clear to what extent the central bank could resist 
governments’ credit demands in practice. For example the annual data provided by the IMF 
show that the monetary authority’s claims on governments (excluding IMF loans which are 
                                                 
4 In September 1998 the council of ministers decided to phase out central bank financing of 
government budget deficits entirely by 2002, except for within-year advances to smooth 
cash-flows. 
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administrated by the BCEAO and lent on to the national governments) exceeded 20% of 
government revenues in Togo in 1995 and 1996 and in Côte d’Ivoire in 1994. 
 
If the BCEAO’s ability to resist government borrowing was limited, it may have restricted 
private sector borrowing in response to rising government borrowing, by imposing ceilings on 
central bank refinancing of private sector credit. The BCEAO’s control over lending to the 
private sector has been strengthened considerably in recent years. Until 1989 the BCEAO had 
a statutory obligation to refinance all short-term agricultural credit granted by commercial 
banks, as theoretically these would be ‘self-liquidating’ as the harvest was sold. This law was 
amended in 1989, because it was found that the system was abused and the short-term credits 
were not repaid as expected. Since then agricultural credits have been treated in the same way 
as ordinary credits and a single ceiling has been applied (Union Monetaire Ouest Africaine 
1989). 
 
The third policy tool at the disposal of the BCEAO is the use of reserve requirements. 
Liquidity ratio rules require banks to hold a certain fraction of their assets as reserve deposit 
and the system of setting reserve requirements has been in place since 1993 (IMF 2001). 
According to the IMF Country Report in 2001 reserve requirements are used as a policy tool 
on a country-by-country basis ‘taking into account the disparities in the progression of bank 
liquidity positions in each country’ (IMF 2001: 17). However, the policy has not been used 
actively during the 1990s. Reserve requirements were changed only infrequently (twice each 
in Mali and Burkina, three times in Togo and four times in Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire for 
1995 to 2000). Moreover, actual reserves and required liquid reserves are only weakly 
correlated. An examination of banks’ liquid reserves shows that actual reserves tended to 
exceed required reserves, sometimes by as much as a factor of ten, but during periods of hikes 
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in the required reserve ratio, actual reserve ratios were lower than required reserve ratios in 
Burkina, Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal and Togo. It is possible though that the BCEAO used ‘moral 
suasion’ as a policy tool to influence banks’ reserve levels, using the credible threat of 
imposing higher liquid reserve requirements.  
 
Given that the BCEAO has a number of policy tools, which may have been used in different 
combinations, looking at the use of the policy tools individually may give misleading results. 
We therefore examine to what extent the BCEAO controls private sector credit in the Franc 
Zone member countries, without focusing on a particular policy tool. Did the BCEAO reduce 
total credit in response to emerging inflationary pressure in individual economies? Did the 
BCEAO sterilize foreign capital inflows and foreign borrowing? And did the BCEAO react to 
increased government borrowing by restricting private sector credit? 
 
We use data on Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Senegal and Togo, which represent the 
bulk of output of the West African monetary union and for which monthly data (and quarterly 
data on GDP) are available. The analyses are based on monthly or quarterly data from 1995 to 
2000, that is, since the devaluation of the CFA franc. We exclude observations before 1995 
because in the run-up to the devaluation of the CFA franc monetary policy was dominated by 
the concern over peg stability. Moreover, most of the time series only become stationary after 
the devaluation. The end date of 2000 is used because the GDP data from Fielding et al. 
(2003) are only available until the end of 2000. 
 
The chapter is structured as follows. The following section discusses two previous studies of 
monetary policy in developing countries, which employ a similar methodology to the one 
used in this chapter. Section three discusses the data and methodology. Section four examines 
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whether the BCEAO has systematically influenced domestic credit and credit to the private 
sector in response to monetary policy target variables. Section five concludes.  
 
5.2 Previous Studies of Monetary Policy in Developing Countries 
 
There are a number of previous studies of monetary policy making in developing countries, 
for example, Connolly and Taylor (1979), Fry (1993 and 1995), Kamas (1985 and 1986), 
Savvides’ (1998), Fielding (2002). The following discussion focuses on the 1995 study by Fry 
and the 1998 study by Savvides. The 1993 and 1995 studies by Fry examined monetary policy 
in six Pacific Basin developing countries with a control group of 21 other developing 
countries using annual data from 1960 to 1988. Fry’s monetary policy reaction function was 
specified as: 
 
ΔDC/Y = β0 +β1 ΔNFAY/Yit +β2 ΔNFAY/Y it-1 + β3 (π-π*)it + β4 (π-π*)it-1 +β5 oilinft  
                + β6 oilinf t-1 + β7ΔCGYit + β8 ΔCGYit-1 + β10 REXCHL + uit
 
The dependent variable is the change in domestic credit scaled by GDP to account for size 
effects (ΔDC/Y). The dependent variables are all potential objectives of monetary policy or 
economic variables the central bank needs to take into account when determining domestic 
credit. ΔNFAY/Yit is the change in net foreign assets of the banking system. The variable is 
included to examine whether the central bank sterilizes the effects of the accumulation of 
foreign assets. (π-π*) is the differential between domestic and foreign inflation as inflation 
rates have to converge for long run currency stability. The central bank may either 
accommodate or resist the effect of foreign price shocks, which are proxied by oil-price 
inflation (oilinf). The central bank may also react to increases in government borrowing 
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(ΔCGY) by cutting back lending to the private sector. If the central bank completely 
neutralized the public sector borrowing then the coefficient on this variable would be zero, 
partial neutralization would result in a coefficient less than one. A further variable that the 
central bank may react to is the lagged real exchange rate (REXCHL). The impact of the 
variable is ambiguous. Depreciations are inflationary and therefore may necessitate a 
restrictive credit policy. However, real depreciations raise the cost of servicing foreign debts 
and may therefore increase public sector borrowing.  
 
The estimation method is iterated 3-stage least squares (I3SLS). The I3SLS method estimates 
a system of structural equations where some equations contain endogenous variables. In the 
first stage instrumented values of the endogenous variables are developed. The second stage 
obtains a consistent estimate of the covariance matrix of the equation disturbances. In the 
third stage a generalized least squares type estimation is performed using the covariance 
matrix estimated in the second stage and the instrumented values in place of the endogenous 
variables. Cross equation restrictions were imposed on all coefficients except the intercepts. 
The endogenous variables are ΔNFAY/Yit and (π-π*)it. The instruments for ΔNFAY/Yit  and 
(π-π*)it are all exogenous variables as well as lagged values of the endogenous variables, as 
well as US inflation, the world interest rate, world economic growth, lagged values of real 
GNP growth and money (M2) growth. 
 
Fry’s results showed that developing country central banks react systematically to a number 
of economic variables. In the full sample the countries sterilized a small fraction (17 per cent) 
of foreign capital inflows and tended to accommodate domestic inflation and increases in oil 
prices. Central banks also accommodated most of the governments’ credit requirement, 
contracting credit to the private sector by only 12 per cent of the increase in the governments’ 
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credit requirements. The Pacific Basin countries on the other hand sterilized 41 per cent of 
foreign capital inflows, were less accommodating regarding oil price inflation and neutralized 
two thirds of government borrowing.  
 
A highly relevant application of Fry’s methodology is Savvides’ (1998) study of the 
development of domestic credit in five SSA countries including three countries in the Franc 
Zone.5 Savvides (1998) estimated the following regression, also using iterated 3-stage least 
squares (3SLS) with annual data from 1968–1991 for Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon and 1975–
1988 for Cameroon.  
 
ΔDC/Y = β0 +β1 ΔNFAY/Yit +β2 ΔNFAY/Y it-1 + β3 (π-π*)it + β4 (π-π*)it-1 +β5 oilinft  
               + β6 oilinf t-1 + β7ΔCGYit + β8 ΔCGYit-1 + β10 REXCHL + β11 DET/Yt-1 + uit
 
The Savvides regression therefore uses all the explanatory variables of the Fry regressions, 
and also tests whether the central bank reacts to growing external indebtedness (DET/Y) by 
restricting the growth of domestic credit. Cross-country equality restrictions were imposed on 
all coefficients except the intercept. ΔNFAY/Yit and (π-π*)it were treated as endogenous 
variables and all the exogenous variables as well as lagged values of the endogenous variables 
were used as instruments. Savvides results show that there was no systematic sterilization of 
reserve accumulations in the Franc Zone member countries and that the (lagged) inflation 
differential and oil price inflation were accommodated. However private sector credit was 
restricted to some extent as public sector credit was expanded. With respect to rising external 
                                                 
5 The countries in the Savvides paper are Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana and 
Nigeria, but a separate regression is performed for the Franc Zone countries.  
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indebtedness the central bank action was stabilizing. Finally the BCEAO responded to a real 
depreciation of the CFA franc by increasing domestic credit. 
 
5.3 Data and Methodology 
 
We use the I3SLS methodology and most of the explanatory variables suggested by Fry 
(1995) and Savvides (1998). However, there are a number of important differences in our 
regressions.  
 
(1) We use monthly data as the BCEAO makes interest rate policy decisions on a monthly 
basis. Therefore the analysis based on monthly data is consistent with the timing of 
BCEAO board meetings and it allows us to focus our examination on the period after 
the devaluation of the CFA Franc.  
(2) Our data are from 1995 to 2000. The starting point of January 1995 was chosen to 
examine monetary policy after the devaluation of the CFA franc. Moreover, several of 
the time series only become stationary in 1995 or have large structural breaks in the 
months following the devaluation. The end point of 2000 was dictated by the 
availability of the quarterly output gap data, taken from Fielding et al. (2003), as the 
IFS only records annual GDP data.6 All variables other than the output data are taken 
from the International Financial Statistics database.  
(3) We do not use domestic credit scaled by GDP (DC/Y) as the dependent variable, but 
private sector credit. The total credit series (***32...ZF…) is calculated by the IFS as 
the sum of claims government, claims on the private sector and claims on other 
                                                 
6 To get a monthly dataset we used the quarterly figure for the three months in the quarter. 
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financial institutions. In the Franc Zone central bank credit to the government (CGY) is 
a very large part of total credit to government, especially because IMF credits are 
channelled through the BCEAO. CGY is therefore a major component of total credit 
and should not be used as an explanatory variable in the domestic credit regression. We 
circumvent this problem by using credit to the private sector/GDP (PSC/Y) as the 
dependent variable.7 This still allows us to examine whether the BCEAO offsets 
government borrowing from the central bank, which would be indicated by a negative 
coefficient for the CGY variable. In the CGY variable used in the regressions we 
remove the component of the monetary authorities’ claims on the government that is 
accounted for by IMF credits, to get a purer proxy for government borrowing from the 
central bank.  
(4) Both the Fry (1995) and Savvides (1998) regressions include a variable tracking the 
changes in the real exchange rate. We exclude this variable in our regressions, as the 
variable is not relevant for the Franc Zone countries after the devaluation of 1994. Any 
movement in the real exchange rate would be captured by the inflation differential.  
(5) We replace the variable of the level of foreign debt/GDP (DET/Y) with the change in 
the level of foreign debt/GDP (ΔDET/Y), because the DETY series is not stationary in 
Senegal and Togo unless it is differenced once. All other variables suggested by Fry 
(1995) and Savvides (1998) are already in differences and are stationary.8 
(6) As we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no residual auto-correlation in the regression 
for Togo and only marginally reject it for Côte d’Ivoire we also include a lagged 
                                                 
7 IFS line ***32D…ZF… claims on private sector from ‘Monetary Survey’. 
8 According to both the augmented Dickey Fuller and the Phillips Perron tests.  
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dependent variable in the regressions. This corrects the problem of residual auto-
correlation in all country regressions.9 
(7) To account for potential seasonal effects in the monthly series we also include the 
dependent variable lagged by a year. Part of private sector credit may well be linked to 
the agricultural cycle and we do indeed find there to be statistically significant seasonal 
effects particularly in Burkina Faso and Senegal. 
(8) Lastly we test whether the cross-equation restrictions are valid and as some of the 
constraints can be rejected we re-estimate the equations without the constraints on the 
coefficients.  
 
There are two further variables, which are potential target variables for the BCEAO. First the 
BCEAO may respond to a contraction in economic activity by expanding domestic credit and 
vice versa. However, the only proxy for GDP data is the quarterly series constructed by 
Fielding et al. (2003). A monthly interpolation of any output gap measure based on these 
quarterly data is unlikely to be a good proxy of the data on economic activity available to the 
BCEAO at its monthly meetings.10 Unfortunately data on unemployment and industrial 
production, which could serve as an alternative proxy for information available to the 
BCEAO are only published quarterly or annually, if at all.11
 
                                                 
9 Using a Lagrange Multiplier test (Greene 2003: 271). 
10 When a measure of the output gap based on the Fielding data is included its coefficient is 
never significant. 
11 Industrial production is available quarterly for Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal only and 
unemployment is available annually for Côte d’Ivoire only (IFS). 
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Second, given the constraints of the peg the BCEAO may also be sensitive to a loss of its 
centrally held foreign exchange reserves. BCEAO policy rules require credit restrictions 
whenever gross foreign assets fall below 20 per cent of sight liabilities. However, the 20% 
ratio was not breached in the period under investigation and the variable was not significant in 
any specification of the regressions. We therefore do not include it in the regressions reported 
below.  
 
The subsequent regression therefore tests whether the BCEAO reacts to the following 
monetary policy target variables: the change in banks’ foreign exchange reserves/GDP, the 
change in the level of foreign debt/GDP, the countries’ inflation differentials with France, the 
change in central bank credit to the government/GDP12 and oil price inflation. 
 
ΔPSC/Y= β0 +β1 ΔPSC/Y it-1 + β1 ΔPSC/Y it-12 + β3  ΔNFAY/Yit +β4 ΔNFAY/Y it-1 + 
β5ΔDET/Yt-1  + β6 (π-π*)it + β7 (π-π*)it-1 + β8 ΔCGYit + β9 ΔCGYit-1 + β10 oilinf + uit  
 
Current net foreign assets and the current inflation gap are treated as endogenous variables as 
they are linked to domestic credit through the banks’ balance sheets. All the exogenous 
variables as well as lagged values of the endogenous variables (lag length 
t-2) are used as instruments. The methodology used is I3SLS.13 The regressions are initially 
performed with cross-country equality restrictions on the coefficients (other than the 
                                                 
12 IFS lines ***12A..ZF… minus (***2..AA.ZF… times ***.2TL.ZF… ) 
13 Qualitatively similar results are obtained if OLS is used instead of I3SLS. We report the 
I3SLS results because it is the more efficient estimation method and to make the results 
comparable to the Savvides results. 
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intercepts) following Savvides and Fry. We then test the validity of the constraints on the 
coefficients. Given that most constraints are rejected at the 5 per cent level we re-estimate the 
equations without the cross-country equality restrictions. The results show that there was no 
systematic response to target variables across the five countries. 
 
5.4.1 Regressions with Constrained Coefficients 
 
In the regression of the determinants of private sector credit, where the coefficients (other 
than on the intercepts) are constrained it appears that the BCEAO was sensitive to some 
monetary policy variables.  
 
ΔPSC/Y = β0 – 0.130*** ΔPSC/Y it-1 + 0.324*** ΔPSC/Y it-12 +0.060*** ΔNFAY/Yit  
                  – 0.028* ΔNFAY/Yit-1 +1.402* ΔDETYt-1 – 0.076*** (π-π*)it  
                  + 0.017 (π-π*)it-1 + 0.014*** ΔCGYit + 0.002 ΔCGYit-1  
                  – 0.001 oilinf + uit 14
 
Only a very small fraction of increases in current foreign capital inflows are lent on to the 
private sector and there appears to be an attempt to sterilize lagged foreign capital inflows. 
The coefficients on the foreign assets variables (current and lagged) are significant at the 1 
and 5 per cent level respectively. The results also show a marginally significant relationship 
between increases in long-term foreign debt and increasing domestic credit, contradicting the 
Savvides result of a stabilising central bank reaction to rising external indebtedness. There is 
evidence of a contraction in private sector credit to in response to a higher current inflation 
                                                 
14 See Table 5.1 for details. 
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differential: the coefficient on the current inflation differential is negative and the relationship 
is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level. However, the BCEAO does not seem to offset 
increases in government borrowing by reducing private sector credit, as the coefficient on this 
variable is positive. There is no statistically significant relationship between changes in oil 
prices and changes in private sector credit.   
 
These results are in contrast with those of Savvides for the period before the devaluation of 
1994. There is no longer evidence of a policy to restrict private sector credit in response to 
government borrowing from the central bank and no stabilizing response to rising external 
indebtedness. On the other hand credit does not rise to accommodate inflation or oil price 
shocks, but credit policy appears to be restrictive in response to rising inflation.  
 
5.4.2 Regressions with Unconstrained Coefficients 
 
When we test whether we can accept the constraints placed on the coefficients in the 
estimation, we find that we have to reject the constraints on the dependent variable with the 1-
year lag, the lagged changes in net foreign assets and foreign liabilities and the lagged 
changes in government borrowing. We therefore repeat the I3SLS regression without 
constraining the coefficient estimates. The results presented in Table 5.3 show firstly that 
eliminating the constraints on the coefficients results in an improved fit for all the country 
regressions.15 Secondly it appears that policy in the five countries responds differently to the 
independent variables and that there is no clear pattern of a BCEAO credit policy at the 
country level. 
                                                 
15 See R-squared statistics reported in Tables 5.2 and 5.3. 
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 Burkina Faso  
 
In Burkina Faso there are three potential BCEAO target variables, which are statistically 
significant. The coefficients on both current and lagged government borrowing from the 
central bank are positive and highly significant, showing no attempt by the BCEAO to offset 
the effect of increased government borrowing on total credit in the economy. Similarly 
foreign capital inflows feed into domestic credit. The coefficient on the inflation differential is 
negative as expected and but not statistically significant. 
 
Côte d’Ivoire 
 
In Côte d’Ivoire current capital inflows feed into private sector credit to a much smaller extent 
than in Burkina Faso, Mali and Senegal and there appears to be some attempt to sterilize 
lagged foreign capital inflows. The central bank action regarding external indebtedness 
appears to be stabilising (significant at the 10% level). However, the coefficient on the 
inflation variable is now positive (as well as significant at the 1 per cent level) suggesting that 
inflation is accommodated, rather than contained. Again, there appears to be no pattern of 
restricting private sector credit in response to current government borrowing and while the 
coefficient on lagged government borrowing is negative it is not statistically significant.  
 
Mali 
 
In Mali both current and lagged increases in banks’ net foreign assets feed into private sector 
credit. The coefficient on the inflation differential is negative as expected, but not statistically 
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significant. There is no statistically significant relationship between private sector credit and 
government borrowing from the central bank.  
 
Senegal 
 
In Senegal current foreign capital inflows are reflected in increasing private sector credit. 
There appears to be a restrictive credit policy in response to rising inflation, and again private 
sector credit rises with government borrowing from the central bank. The coefficient here is; 
however, lower than in any of the other countries in the zone. 
 
Togo 
 
In Togo there is no evidence for a policy of sterilizing lagged foreign capital inflows and 
changes in the inflation differential with France appear to be accommodated rather than 
contained. Private sector credit again rises with increases in current government borrowing. 
 
The estimation results based on the unconstrained coefficients therefore cast doubt on the 
results obtained in section 5.4.1. There does not appear to be a systematic policy to restrict 
credit in response to emerging inflationary pressures. While the regressions for Burkina Faso, 
Mali and Senegal show the expected negative coefficient on the inflation differential, the 
coefficient is positive and significant in Côte d’Ivoire and Togo. Similarly there is no 
systematic attempt to sterilize foreign capital inflows or foreign borrowing. Increases in long-
term foreign liabilities are only marginally significant in Côte d’Ivoire. The only variable that 
is highly significant in 4 out of the five regressions is the government borrowing from the 
central bank. But when the BCEAO is lending to the member governments it does nothing to 
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offset its effect on domestic credit: domestic credit increases as governments borrow more. 
This result is in contrast to the Savvides results for the period before the devaluation, where 
the BCEAO kept a tighter control on domestic credit and restricted credit to the private sector 
to offset advances made to governments. 
 
5.5 Conclusions 
 
Our results suggest that the BCEAO did not take a particularly active role in steering private 
sector credit in the Franc Zone member countries, although in theory it has several policy 
instruments at its disposal. While the first set of regressions with constrained coefficients 
supported a hypothesis of restrictive credit policy in response to emerging inflationary 
pressures, the second set of regressions showed that across the different countries there is no 
evidence for a systematic policy. Not only do the significance levels and the magnitude of the 
coefficients vary widely, but in some cases the signs on the coefficients are reversed. The only 
result that is consistent across all the countries is that there is no policy to restrict private 
credit if governments increase their borrowing from the BCEAO.  
 
It appears therefore that the BCEAO operates interest rate policy at the zone-level, but does 
little to steer credit policy at the country level, at least on a monthly basis.16 This does raise 
                                                 
16 Another interpretation of the results would be that credit planning takes place on an annual 
basis (which would, however, be in contrast with the monthly setting of interest rates). In 
this case we would not necessarily observe credit responding to monthly variations in 
monetary policy target variables. However, we cannot test the response of the BCEAO to 
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the question of why the de jure powers of the BCEAO to restrict domestic credit growth have 
been strengthened in recent years, with the restrictions imposed on the refinancing of 
agricultural credits, the introduction of reserve requirements and the phasing out of central 
bank financing of government deficits. However, the first two of the measures predate the 
devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994 and may have been attempts to salvage the peg rather 
than being intended to strengthen BCEAO monetary control during periods of peg stability. It 
is therefore possible that BCEAO credit policy would become more pro-active if pressures on 
the currency re-emerged in the future. 
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Table 5.1 
Correlations 
 
Inflation WAMU Burkina Mali RCI Senegal Togo 
WAMU 1.0000      
Burkina 0.7206 1.0000     
Mali 0.7213 0.4419 1.0000    
RCI 0.4883 0.2018 0.1224 1.0000   
Senegal 0.4159 0.0675 0.2626 -0.1744 1.0000  
Togo 0.2329 0.1202 -0.1568 0.2668 -0.2368 1.0000 
 
Output gap* Burkina Mali RCI Senegal Togo 
Burkina 1.0000     
Mali 0.1185 1.0000    
RCI -0.0153 0.0490 1.0000   
Senegal 0.4895 -0.0195 -0.0482 1.0000  
Togo 0.0871 0.0308 0.1423 -0.0682 1.0000 
 
Credit to government Burkina Mali RCI Senegal Togo 
Burkina 1.0000     
Mali 0.8324 1.0000    
RCI 0.7988 0.8035 1.0000   
Senegal 0.5945 0.6091 0.5249 1.0000  
Togo 0.7653 0.7843 0.6219 0.5423 1.0000 
* Based on Fielding et al. (2003) quarterly GDP data 
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Table 5.2 
Private sector credit regressions I3SLS estimates with constrained coefficients 
 
  Burkina Faso Côte d’Ivoire Mali Senegal Togo 
Lagged dependent 
variable (t-1) 
-0.130***      
(.0528) 
-0.130***     
(.0528) 
-0.130***     
(.0528) 
-0.130***      
(.0528) 
-0.130***     
(.0528) 
Lagged dependent 
variable (t-12) 
0.324***      
(.0438) 
0.324***      
(.0438) 
0.324***      
(.0438) 
0.324***      
(.0438) 
0.324***     
(.0438) 
(Change in banks’ net 
foreign assets)t
0.060***    
(0.0167) 
0.060***    
(0.0167) 
0.060***    
(0.0167) 
0.060***    
(0.0167) 
0.060***   
(0.0167) 
(Change in banks’ net 
foreign assets)t-1
-0.028**   
(0.0160) 
-0.028**   
(0.0160) 
-0.028**   
(0.0160) 
-0.028**   
(0.0160) 
-0.028**   
(0.0160) 
(Change in foreign 
liabilities)t-1
1.402*  
(0.7763) 
1.402*  
(0.7763) 
1.402*  
(0.7763) 
1.402*  
(0.7763) 
1.402*  
(0.7763) 
(π-π*)t -0.076***  
(0.0273) 
-0.076***  
(0.0273) 
-0.076***  
(0.0273) 
-0.076***  
(0.0273) 
-0.076***  
(0.0273) 
(π-π*)t-1 0.017  
(0.0226) 
0.017  
(0.0226) 
0.017  
(0.0226) 
0.017  
(0.0226) 
0.017  
(0.0226) 
(Change in CB 
lending to 
government)t 
0.014***   
(0.0015) 
0.014***   
(0.0015) 
0.014***   
(0.0015) 
0.014***   
(0.0015) 
0.014***   
(0.0015) 
(Change in CB 
lending to 
government)t-1 
0.002   
(0.0016) 
0.002   
(0.0016) 
0.002   
(0.0016) 
0.002   
(0.0016) 
0.002   
(0.0016) 
Oil price inflation t -0.001  
(0.0006) 
-0.001  
(0.0006) 
-0.001  
(0.0006) 
-0.001  
(0.0006) 
-0.001  
(0.0006) 
Constant -0.017  
(0.0089) 
-0.005  
(0.0140) 
-0.003  
(0.010) 
-0.003 
(0.0077) 
-0.004  
(0.0223) 
R-Squared 0.6819 0.3027 0.1835 0.3396 0.2839 
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Table 5.3 
Private sector credit regressions I3SLS estimates with unconstrained coefficients 
 
  Burkina Faso Côte d’Ivoire Mali Senegal Togo 
Lagged dependent 
variable (t-12) 
-0.188*     
(0.1091) 
0.210* 
(0.1140) 
-0.138    
(0.1152) 
-0.276** 
(0.1144) 
-0.384*** 
(0.116) 
Lagged dependent 
variable (t-12) 
0.198***     
(0.0573) 
-0.008 
(0.1564) 
0.131    
(0.1039) 
0.164** 
(0.0773) 
0.080 
(0.0880) 
(Change in banks’ 
net foreign 
assets)t
0.370***     
(0.0994) 
0.033**   
(0.0172) 
0.468*** 
(0.0987) 
0.475***   
(0.1903) 
0.185   
(0.1218) 
(Change in banks’ 
net foreign 
assets)t-1
-0.005     
(0.1092) 
-0.039** 
(0.0164) 
0.168*   
(0.1003) 
0.093    
(0.1657) 
-0.112 
(0.1107) 
(Change in foreign 
liabilities)t-1
-0.693    
(0.9518) 
-3.029*   
(1.8331) 
1.042    
(1.6336) 
0.991    
(1.2686) 
-0.503    
(2.086) 
(π-π*)t -0.049    
(0.0331) 
0.148** 
(0.0718) 
-0.055 
(0.0467) 
-0.101*** 
(0.0384) 
0.288***     
(0.1148) 
(π-π*)t-1 -0.011   
(0.0260) 
0.085    
(0.0539) 
0.035    
(0.0375)  
-0.033    
(0.0309) 
-0.079    
(0.0947) 
(Change in CB 
lending to 
government)t
0.019*** 
(0.0067) 
0.032*** 
(0.0037) 
-0.003 
(0.0052) 
0.007*** 
(0.0019) 
0.0142*** 
(0.0030) 
(Change in CB 
lending to 
government)t-1
0.015** 
(0.063) 
-0.066 
(0.0048) 
-0.001 
(0.0062) 
0.002 
(0.0018) 
0.005 
(0.0035) 
Oil price inflation t -0.000    
(0.0007) 
0.001 
(0.0015) 
-0.000   
(0.0009) 
-0.000   
(0.0007 
0.003     
(0.0026) 
Constant -0.0013    
(0.0065) 
0.029* 
(0.0142) 
-0.005   
(0.0095) 
-0.009   
(0.0075) 
0.041*     
(0.0242) 
R-Squared 0.8795 0.5837 0.5433 0.5439 0.4992 
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